

9 July 1957

Copy No. 36

# **CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN**

DOCUMENT NO. 7  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. IT  
11 DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE 4-1-80 REVIEWER:

# OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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### **State Dept. review completed**

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
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## 1. REACTIONS TO THE SOVIET PURGE

### (a) HUNGARY

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The American legation in Budapest notes that the sudden emphasis by the Hungarian party newspaper on the beneficial results of the Soviet 20th party congress reverses the line taken as recently as the Hungarian party conference of 27-29 June. This conference had stressed a generally hard line, failed to mention the 20th party congress in its resolution, and installed a leading Stalinist, Jozsef Revai, in the central committee.

Announcement of the departure of party first secretary Kadar, politburo member Apro and two high government officials "on vacation" is locally interpreted to mean that at least some of these leaders have gone to Moscow for guidance.

Comments in Budapest showed intense interest in Soviet developments and a universal hope that Hungary would benefit in the long run.

Comment                    The Moscow events will spur moderate elements in the Hungarian party to seek some modification of Kadar's terror tactics, demand the removal of Stalinists such as Revai from the central committee, and call for a modification of the policy of intensified pressure on intellectuals. This will contribute to the serious factionalism within the party.

In anticipation of such a move, politburo member Marosan at a 5 July meeting of Budapest activists stated that some party elements would see in the Soviet party resolution a vindication of "revisionist and right-wing" views. "We must reject this most energetically since it is similar to that which dragged us toward October 23."

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## (b) WEST GERMANY

Chancellor Adenauer, in a published interview, has compared the recent Moscow shake-up to the internecine struggle after Lenin's death, and says Khrushchev, like Stalin, will try to eliminate all his rivals. In the interview and in an election campaign speech on 7 July, Adenauer said that he will believe in a change of policy only when one is borne out by the attitude of the Soviet delegation at the London disarmament talks. Opposition Socialist chief Ollenhauer, on the other hand, told another political rally that "the radical shake-up in the Kremlin showed that the Soviet government wants a settlement of certain international problems."

One Bonn government official stated

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that it is the consensus of West German officials that the Soviet dismissals are primarily the logical outcome of the power struggle within the Kremlin and not a conflict between Stalinists and anti-Stalinists. He claimed that West German officials generally see the dismissals as unlikely to affect present Soviet policy, except that Khrushchev will exploit them for propaganda purposes to try to convince the West of Moscow's intentions favoring a detente.

On the other hand, some high officials of the Eastern Division of the Bonn Foreign Ministry told members of the American embassy in Bonn that they now see the way clear for a more flexible Soviet policy toward nonbloc states. They see the events as an important step by Khrushchev toward his assertion of personal dictatorship. In disagreeing with one of their colleagues, Boris Meissner, who sees the emergence of a triumvirate of Bulganin, Khrushchev, and Zhukov, they stress that Bulganin is a negligible force and that Zhukov has no political aspirations.

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(c) FRANCE

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Soviet specialists in the French Foreign Ministry interpret the Soviet shake-up as primarily a power struggle and warn against hopes for a favorable evolution of Kremlin views toward a detente. They believe the changes will have little effect on Soviet foreign policy, with the exception of Yugoslav relations where some improvement may be possible, and regard with pessimism the strengthening of Khrushchev whom they consider particularly dangerous. In internal policy they expect a hard line to continue with emphasis on productivity and priority of heavy industry.

The head of the European desk in the Foreign Ministry believes that Soviet policy toward disarmament will not be affected although Soviet leaders may use the purge to bolster their claim to peace-loving intentions. He sees little probability that the shake-up will have repercussions among Satellite leaderships, other than in Rumania. He notes French Communist leader Maurice Thorez' enthusiastic response to the shake-up despite the fact that his party is the most Stalinist of the Western European Communist parties, and believes Thorez may use Soviet developments to crush revisionists in the French party.

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